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Introduction
The aim of this project has been to develop and reﬁne methods to measure
the allocation of power in voting situations. In our research plan we have
outlined three particular areas. While many of the results are yet to be
published, we are proud to say that the project has been successful both in
producing interesting results in all these areas and to produce high quality
international publications.
In the following we outline the results per area. In the text we omit
citations to the general literature  for that we refer the reader to our papers.
1 Strategic voting games
Despite the sound mathematical foundations of power indices, all the widely
used power indices exhibit properties considered strange or counter-intuitive.
The strange features are known as the paradoxes of voting power in the lit-
erature. This line of research has focussed on the paradox of quarrelling
members: the observation that two voters may mutually beneﬁt from refus-
ing to cooperate.
We have introduced strategic voting games, where the individual players
unilaterally initiate a quarrel to increase their power: At ﬁrst it may sound
paradoxical that someone's power can increase by refusing to participate in
majority coalitions. While this general observation is not so surprising, the
exact speciﬁcation of the model including the existence of the corresponding
noncooperative equilibrium is less straightforward. We have introduced two
alternative models (Kóczy, 2008b, 2010c), where, despite relatively minor
diﬀerences the conclusions are surprisingly diﬀerent. In either case we present
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a unique strategic modiﬁcation of a
power index.
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We ﬁnd that only minimal winning coalitions might sustain, surplus coali-
tions are subject to quarrelling (while some minimal winning coalitions might
be, too).
We were also interested in other paradoxes and in the possibility to mod-
ify power indices in such a way that the mathematical foundations are still
there, but their predictions are less surprising. Looking into this problem
Kóczy (2009b) has found that the paradox of new members contradicts the
null player property. This paradox states that a voter's power may increase
when new voters are admitted into the voting body and so each member's
voting share decreases. The null player property states that a voter must
have zero power if its addition to a subset of the voters never turns the coali-
tion into a winning coalition and therefore never contributes to the decision
making. Interestingly the power index where power equals to the share of
voting weights does not exhibit any of the paradoxical properties (Kóczy,
2008a). This index gives the natural, instinctive allocation of power. When
we talk about paradoxes, then perhaps we only criticise that the predictions
diﬀer from this allocation.
The eﬀect of quarrelling works via the externalities and so the game can
be seen as a coalition formation (or rather: a coalition destruction) game with
externalities. For these games we had already deﬁned the core and now we
have been working on its implementation. Kóczy (2009c) provide results for
totally balanced games, while Kóczy (2009e) promises a completely general
characterisation on the set of games in partition function form. A better
understanding of coalitional games with externalities will allow us to deﬁne
the equilibrium of the quarrelling game in a more direct and more general
way. This, however remains an open question.
We have also looked at applying the model to particular voting situations
where the quarrelling could make sense. It turned out, however, that, apart
from fairly small games, the problem is very complex. Lange and Kóczy
(2010) introduced a way to compute power indices directly from the minimal
winning coalitions, skipping the step of generating the whole set of winning
coalitions thereby conceptually and usually also computationally simplifying
the calculations.
Tanvé (2010a,b) studies the strategic aspects of programme and commu-
nication strategies of parties: what and how do parties communicate in a
two-party system. Under what conditions can we expect the convergence of
campaign issues, and to what extent do parties wish to make their positions
clear.
The ﬁeld of 'bargaining committees' can be seen as extension of voting
games. The theory on voting games aims to answer the question what is
the extent of power each individual voter holds. The theory on committees
takes this question one step further in asking how voters actually use this
power. If a number of voters is to agree on a certain division of a perfectly
divisible good, then logically one would expect a dictator to take the entire
2
good and a voter without power to be left empty-handed. The question
what happens when the case is less clear cut can be answered to some extent
by the concept of "solution/value", a mathematical object that integrates
the Shapley-Shubik power index and the Nash bargaining solution, on a
conceptual as well as axiomatic level.
The Nash bargaining solution might be unacceptably robust against
changes in the bargaining situation, reveals that the solution/value is not
without problems. In particular, in the setting of repeated play, it is possible
that abstention (that is: refusal to play) in a number of voting rounds leaves
the share a player can secure unaﬀected. This problem could be mended
by integrating the Shapley-Shubik power index with a 'monotonic' bar-
gaining solution. However, the ideal candidate, Dubra's asymmetric Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution, has only been formalised for two-person games, which
implies that the implied solution/value would only be meaningful when the
number of committee members is restricted to two.
An extension to bargaining committees with any ﬁnite number of voting
members thus necessitates a similar extension of Dubra's bargaining solu-
tion. Driesen, Perea, and Peters (2011) obtained a generalised deﬁnition
and axiomatic characterisation of this asymmetric, monotonic, multi-player
solution. Driesen (2011) provided an alternative axiomatisation of Imai's
lexicographic maximin solution.
2 Spatial voting games and power over communi-
cation networks
Unlike in games with quarrelling, where the set of feasible coalitions is de-
termined endogenously, in this subproject we assume that there is an under-
lying structure given by geography or the political positions of voters that
determines which coalitions may form. For instance, over the linear political
spectrum we often presume connected coalitions, that is, the (moderate) left
and right will not for a coalition unless centre is also included.
Reynaud, Lange, Gatarek, and Thimann (2007) study spatial voting via
the example of voting in the IMF. The interests of countries with intensive
trade relations are similar even if their structure or level of development is
diﬀerent. The trade volume between two countries can therefore be seen as
a measure of proximity. The game thereby deﬁned can be solved, but the
general problem remains open.
Ghintran, Gonzalez-Arangüena, and Manuel (2010); Ghintran (2012)
study situations where the power of a player is partly given by its loca-
tion on a network. While in theory this could depend on the entire network,
perhaps the most interesting part is how to share the value added by a new
link or arc.
In a forthcoming paper Ghintran (2012) considers situations where agents
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use their negotiation power to aﬀect the distribution of the worth on their
behalf and deﬁnes an allocation rule that describes the impact of the nego-
tiation power of agents on the distribution of the worth among them. This
allocation rule satisﬁes a set of attractive properties.
Ghintran, Gonzalez-Arangüena, and Manuel (2010) considers situations
where the network structure is not given and ﬁxed, that is, several alterna-
tive networks can form and thus players are able to form occasional alliances
as well as long term relationships. We model such situations by using prob-
abilistic networks. We deﬁne an allocation rule for the class of probabilistic
communication situation and provide two characterisations for this solution.
Béal, Ghintran, Rémila, and Solal (2011) overview the literature of al-
location problems in a special network: a river. A river diﬀers from other
networks in that it has a direction, strategies aﬀect other players only down-
stream and there are no (directed) circles.
Béal, Chakrabarti, Ghintran, and Solal (2010) study the solution con-
cepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative
Stackelberg equilibria and establish suﬃcient conditions for which partial co-
operative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equi-
libria exist in supermodular games. Such solutions are useful in strategic
network formation games as highlighted by the application in the paper.
Tournaments are directed graphs, where the the direction of an arc tells
us the winner of a particular pairwise comparison. Here the objective is not
to determine an allocation, but a winner, or more generally the ranking of
the nodes. Kóczy and Strobel (2010) introduced a method to rank academic
journals using a tournament approach and provide a ranking of the main
academic journals in economics. Kóczy and Strobel (2008) show that the
acclaimed invariant method can be manipulated: a journal can improve its
position in the ranking by making a citation to another journal. Kóczy,
Nichifor, and Strobel (2009) investigate the property of article splitting 
the length of a typical paper should not inﬂuence the quality ranking  and
introduce a modiﬁed version of the invariant method that is invariant to
article splitting too.
3 Gradual coalitions
In the third and last subproject we are interested in the same type of re-
sults, but in a more general setting where the membership of players in the
coalitions is not certain and/or the value of coalitions is a random variable.
Kóczy and Pintér (2011b) introduced generalised weighted voting games.
These games are motivated by weighted voting situations via representatives,
where, due to illness or other engagement a voting block, such as a party
cannot always rely on the full number of representatives and hence the full
weight in the voting game. Such a model ﬁts very well voting in a national
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Figure 1: Representation per citizen from Germany to Cyprus (Kóczy, 2011).
parliament (Kóczy and Pintér, 2011a).
Lange and Grabisch (2008, 2011) respectively generalised the Shapley-
value to multichoice games and bi-capacities. Lange (2010) took a somewhat
diﬀerent approach by introducing fuzzy voting games and studying the power
distribution in these games. The application of this fuzzy approach to net-
work games is still underway with Ghintran.
4 Other results
We also mention a number of results that do not form an integral part of the
original research proposal, but are closely related.
4.1 Applications
Kóczy (2011, 2010b) combines the theory of power indices with demographic
data from the European Statistical Oﬃce to ﬁnd that Lisbon Treaty does not
only increase the decision probability in the EU Council of Ministers, but the
beneﬁts are not shared equally. The biggest losses are suﬀered by medium-
sized countries with shrinking populations, with Hungary in the bottom 3
when ranked by the change in power.
Kóczy (2010e) calculates power distributions in international organisa-
tions, focussing on the Bretton Woods institutions and ﬁnds that if switching
between country groups were permitted, Hungary would be better oﬀ joining
the Scandinavian group.
Still on the topic of international organisations, Kóczy (2010d) provides
a foresighted model to explain strategic diﬀerences between the EFTAn and
Eastern extensions of the European Union.
4.2 Stability
In the theory of values it is simply assumed that the grand coalition forms
due to eﬃciency considerations and the only task for the social planner is to
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ﬁnd a fair allocation of the resource or costs. In many of the applications,
however a coalition of the players, unhappy with the allocation, has the
possibility to leave the grand coalition and thereby provide an improvement
to all its members. Such a departure is never proﬁtable if the allocation
belongs to the core, however this can only be guaranteed for convex games.
Csóka, Herings, Kóczy, and Pintér (2011); Csóka, Herings, and Kóczy (2011)
provide expressions for TU and NTU games to test convexity.
In matching problems we look for solutions that are stable and fair.
Kóczy (2009a) provides a general introduction to general matching problems,
while Kóczy (2010a) evaluates the Hungarian high school and university ad-
mission systems from a matching theoretic point of view.
Kóczy (2009d,e) implements the pessimistic recursive core by means of a
sequential noncooperative process. The ﬁrst paper has more limited results
to partition function form games where all the residual cores are nonempty,
while the second paper generalises these results to all partition function form
games.
5 Dissemination of the results
Besides the publications referenced at the end of the paper, the members
of the group have presented their work at numerous conferences and visits
including the following:
2008 MKE2008, Budapest; Corvinus, Budapest;
2009 SING5, Amsterdam; EURO XXIII, Bonn; Coalition Theory Work-
shop, Maastricht; UECE Meeting, Lisbon; New Topics on Game The-
ory; Seville; Economics, Management and Finance, Monpellier; MOK
XVIII, Balaton®szöd; Budapest Tech, Jubilee Conference, Budapest;
Tinbergen Workshop, Amsterdam; GREQAM, Marseille; Corvinus,
Budapest
2010 SCW10 Moscow; SING6, Palermo; CTN, Marseille; MINT1, Lyon;
ComSoc Workshop; Dagstuhl; UECE Meeting, Lisbon; Chinese Game
Theory and Experimental Economics Association Conference, Beijing;
Bolyai Memorial Conference, Budapest; MKE2010, Budapest; IEHAS
Seminar; Budapest; Corvinus, Budapest;
2011 SING7, Paris; MINT2, St-Étienne; SAET, Faro; LGS6, Bucharest;
PET11, Bloomington, IN; International Workshop of Game Theory,
Tel Aviv; Ostrava University, Ostrava; Corvinus, Budapest
The game theory blogs (koczy.blog.hu in Hungarian; laszlokoczy.blogspot.com
in English) of the principal investigator have also proved to be a very eﬃcient
way to communicate the results to the broader public.
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